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ABSTRACT 32 
“Intrinsic motivation crowding out”, the erosion of high-quality, sustainable motivation through the 33 
introduction of financial incentives, is one of the most frequently discussed but yet little researched 34 
potential unfavorable consequence of Performance-based Financing (PBF). We used the opportunity of 35 
the introduction of PBF in Malawi to investigate whether and how PBF affected intrinsic motivation, 36 
using a mixed-methods research design theoretically grounded in Self-Determination Theory (SDT). 37 
The quantitative component served to estimate the impact of PBF on intrinsic motivation, relying on a 38 
controlled pre- and post-test design, with data collected from health workers in 23 intervention and 10 39 
comparison facilities before (March/April 2013; n=70) and approximately two years after (June/July 40 
2015; n=71) the start of the intervention. The qualitative component, relying on in-depth interviews 41 
with health workers in selected intervention facilities one (April 2014; n=21) and two (September 2015; 42 
n=20) years after the start of PBF, served to understand how PBF did or did not bring about change in 43 
intrinsic motivation. Specifically, it allowed us to examine how the various motivation-relevant 44 
elements and consequences of PBF impacted health workers’ basic psychological needs for autonomy, 45 
competence, and relatedness, which SDT postulates as central to intrinsic motivation. Our results 46 
suggest that PBF did not affect health workers’ overall intrinsic motivation levels, with the intervention 47 
having both positive and negative effects on psychological needs satisfaction. To maximize positive 48 
PBF effects on intrinsic motivation, our results underline the potential value of explicit strategies to 49 
mitigate unintended negative impact of unavoidable design, implementation, and contextual challenges, 50 
for instance by building autonomy support activities into PBF designs. 51 
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INTRODUCTION 57 
Performance-based financing (PBF) currently receives much attention in low- and middle income 58 
countries (LMIC) as a means to strengthen effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare service provision. 59 
PBF aims to improve utilization and quality of healthcare services by motivating healthcare providers 60 
to better align their service provision behavior with health system interests. This is done through 61 
performance contracts which financially reward the attainment of defined performance standards while 62 
simultaneously improving facilities’ decision autonomy on financial and productive resources 63 
(Renmans, Holvoet, Criel, & Meessen, 2017). Performance is monitored through close supervision and 64 
external verification. Facilities are ideally completely autonomous in how to spend their PBF surplus, 65 
although most current PBF schemes prescribe that revenues generated through PBF are to be partially 66 
reinvested into the facility, and partially available for bonus payments to staff members (Fritsche, 67 
Soeters, & Meessen, 2014). The wish for such additional income is thought to motivate health facilities 68 
and their staff to align service provision with health system interests and guidelines. 69 
There are concerns that PBF might inadvertently undermine health workers’ inherent willingness to 70 
perform well (“intrinsic motivation”) (Ireland, Paul, & Dujardin, 2011). This is referred to as “intrinsic 71 
motivation crowding out”. Experimental research in non-healthcare settings conducted by psychologist 72 
and economists since the 1970s shows that crowding out of intrinsic motivation through performance-73 
contingent financial incentives is possible under certain conditions (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). 74 
The literature further underlines that such intrinsic motivation crowding out could have unfavorable 75 
effects considering that intrinsic forms of motivation have consistently been shown to be superior to 76 
other forms of motivation with regards to performance and other important work-related outcomes 77 
(Gagné & Deci, 2005; Miquelon & Vallerand 2008). 78 
It is unclear to which extent this body of research applies to LMIC healthcare settings and PBF schemes, 79 
and whether concerns about crowding out of intrinsic motivation by PBF are therefore substantiated. In 80 
the literature and discourse around how and why PBF effects change, the individual financial incentive 81 
component dominates, but there is increased recognition and evidence that PBF is a much more complex 82 
reform package (Renmans et al., 2017). Specifically, PBF not only includes reward payment activities, 83 
but also necessitates performance contracts and verification and usually includes various other elements 84 
aimed at strengthening health system functions and promoting results orientation, such as a 85 
strengthening of performance monitoring, feedback systems and management structures, or capacity 86 
building measures (Renmans, Holvoet, Orach, & Criel, 2016; Witter et al., 2013). Experiences across 87 
different PBF schemes indicate that PBF has the potential to positively change health workers’ work 88 
realities in ways which might actually help them act on existing intrinsic motives rather than crowd out 89 
intrinsic motivation. For instance, in Benin, PBF strengthened various health system functions such as 90 
supervision and resource supply (Paul, Sossouhounto, & Eclou, 2018). Similarly, in Nigeria, health 91 
workers spoke of important improvements in their working conditions, and in consequence in their 92 
performance, which they experienced as very motivating and satisfying (Bhatnagar & George, 2016). 93 
In Malawi, PBF had transformed health workers’ working environments in various positive ways, for 94 
instance by increasing the availability of equipment and supplies, introducing clear performance 95 
objectives, and strengthening supervisory structures (Lohmann et al., 2018). In light of these and other 96 
experiences, arguments can also be made that PBF does not erode, but rather supports and fosters 97 
intrinsic motivation overall (“crowding in”; Lohmann, Houlfort, & De Allegri, 2016). 98 
To our knowledge, to date, only three studies have explicitly investigated the impact of PBF on health 99 
workers’ intrinsic motivation in LMIC, with results suggesting that intrinsic motivation might have 100 
been crowded out by the respective PBF interventions at least to some extent (Aninanya et al., 2016, in 101 
Ghana; Dale, 2014, in Afghanistan; Huillery & Seban, 2014, in the Democratic Republic of Congo). 102 
Unfortunately, none of these studies included an explanatory component. Further research is therefore 103 
urgently needed to understand how PBF interventions act on intrinsic motivation and can be designed 104 
in a way to preserve or even foster rather than erode important pre-existing motivational capacities.  105 
Against this background, we used the opportunity of the introduction of PBF in Malawi, the Results-106 
Based Financing for Maternal and Newborn Health (RBF4MNH) Initiative, to estimate the impact of 107 
PBF on intrinsic motivation, and to explore how and why PBF did or did not bring about change, using 108 
a mixed-methods research design theoretically grounded in Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Ryan & 109 
Deci, 2017). In alignment with our above-outlined understanding of PBF as a complex intervention 110 
package, in which financial rewards constitute one of several elements, we did not attempt to isolate 111 
the effects of the individual rewards, but rather investigated RBF4MNH’s impact on intrinsic 112 
motivation in a holistic way. 113 
Conceptual framework 114 
Our understanding of intrinsic motivation is grounded in Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 115 
2017). At the heart of SDT is the idea that a sense of volition in one’s behavior and a congruency of 116 
behavior with own values, goals and needs is central to individual wellbeing, well-functioning, and 117 
growth. In particular, SDT considers the fulfillment of three fundamental psychological needs as 118 
central. In the context of work, the need for autonomy refers to the desire to endorse and believe in 119 
one’s actions at work, and to be able to act according to one’s beliefs and professional opinions, within 120 
professional borders. The need for competence refers to the inherent desire to do well and feel effective 121 
in one’s job. The need for relatedness refers to a desire for successful, respectful, and caring 122 
interpersonal relationships and interactions at work. 123 
SDT posits that people are naturally inclined to perform behavior which they find inherently enjoyable 124 
or which contributes to the fulfillment of the basic psychological needs. Such behavior is termed 125 
“autonomously motivated”. SDT’s autonomous motivation is very closely related to what is commonly 126 
understood as intrinsic motivation in the public health and economics literature and discourse (e.g. 127 
Leonard, Serneels, & Brock, 2013; Romaniuc, 2017): a willingness to act resulting from inherently 128 
satisfying characteristics or consequences of behavior, not necessitating specific external inducement. 129 
In this study, we operationalize intrinsic motivation as autonomous motivation, and use the terms 130 
interchangeably throughout the text.  131 
SDT-based research from a vast range of domains and settings has demonstrated that basic needs 132 
satisfaction determines autonomous motivation, and has consistently related autonomous motivation to 133 
better work performance and other important work outcomes such as higher job satisfaction, 134 
organizational commitment, and well-being, compared to non-autonomous motivation (Gagné & Deci, 135 
2005). Autonomous motivation has also been found more robust and stable over time than non-136 
autonomous motivation. The SDT-based literature therefore underlines the importance of preserving 137 
and fostering autonomous motivation in the introduction of PBF and other interventions. 138 
With the concept of basic needs satisfaction, SDT offers an explanatory framework of how and why 139 
external interventions aimed at behavior change impact autonomous motivation. As a complex external 140 
stimulus, PBF is likely to alter health workers’ objective and subjective work realities and work 141 
behaviors in numerous needs-supportive but possibly also needs-thwarting ways. Depending on health 142 
workers’ perceptions of and experiences with the specific intervention design, implementation, and 143 
results, and the extent to which these positively or negatively affect basic needs satisfaction, PBF might 144 
therefore both crowd in and crowd out autonomous work motivation (Lohmann et al., 2016). 145 
Our prior work on the motivational effects of RBF4MNH 146 
In a previous publication, we described the motivational mechanisms of RBF4MNH in detail (Lohmann 147 
et al., 2018). RBF4MNH motivated health workers to improve their performance by acting as a wake-148 
up call to previous substandard performance; by providing direction and goals to work towards; by 149 
strengthening perceived ability to do well at work; by making health workers feel more recognized in 150 
their work; by triggering motivating changes in social dynamics at work; and by providing an 151 
opportunity to earn additional income. At the same time, various challenges were identified which 152 
negatively impacted motivation, thereby attenuating RBF4MNH’s potential motivating effect. Such 153 
challenges included overly ambitious targets given low staffing levels and persisting shortages in drugs 154 
and supplies, perceived unfairness of the verification process, and diverse frustrations and interpersonal 155 
conflict related to the amount and use of the PBF reward payments.  156 
This article builds directly on this previous work, analyzing through a Self-Determination Theory lens 157 
how the various positive and negative motivational effects of RBF4MNH affected the satisfaction of 158 
the basic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, to explain how and why RBF4MNH did or 159 
did not impact autonomous motivation. 160 
 161 
METHODS  162 
Setting: Health workforce in Malawi. Malawi relies on a predominantly public, three-tier health 163 
system which provides essential healthcare services free of charge at point of service. Service utilization 164 
is high (NSO, 2016), but quality often poor for various reasons including a severe health worker 165 
shortage leading to high workload levels particularly for mid-level cadres who provide the vast majority 166 
of essential services, frequent but unsupportive and low-quality management and supervision, and 167 
frequent stock-outs of drugs and supplies (Bradley et al., 2015; Manafa et al., 2009; MoH, 2014). 168 
Beyond these aspects, previous research has found health workers dissatisfied and frustrated with low 169 
income levels; delays in salary payments; lack of transparency and perceived unfairness of salary top-170 
ups and per diems; seniority- rather than merit-based progression on salary scales; limited training and 171 
career opportunities; and a general lack of recognition of their efforts by managers and other health 172 
system actors (Chimwaza et al., 2014; Manafa et al., 2009). Despite often dissatisfying and 173 
demotivating work environments, Malawian health workers expressed high levels of pride and feelings 174 
of achievement and importance in relation to their job in previous research (Goldberg & Ron Levey, 175 
2012). Health workers in rural areas in particular stated to be motivated because of the opportunity to 176 
serve communities in need, by a sense of patriotic duty, and by the opportunity to learn and grow on 177 
the job (Manafa et al., 2009). 178 
The RBF4MNH Initiative. RBF4MNH was introduced in April 2013 by the Malawian Ministry of 179 
Health (MoH) with financial support by the governments of Norway and Germany and technical support 180 
by Options Consulting, initially in 14 primary- and 4 secondary-level health facilities in the Balaka, 181 
Dedza, Ntcheu, and Mchinji districts (Phase I), and extended to 10 additional facilities in 2014 (Phase 182 
II). RBF4MNH combines PBF with conditional cash transfers (CCT) to pregnant women to increase 183 
the quantity and quality of delivery services. The PBF component includes performance contracts 184 
targeting health facilities and District Health Management Teams (DHMT). Health facilities were 185 
selected into the intervention in a non-random way based on their ability to serve as emergency obstetric 186 
care centers. In most selected facilities, this necessitated substantial unconditional start-up support in 187 
the form of infrastructure upgrades, provision of essential equipment, refresher trainings, and additional 188 
staff postings. Health facilities are rewarded for the attainment of performance targets which reinforce 189 
adherence to treatment standards for maternal care (e.g. correct use of partographs, HIV testing in 190 
pregnancy). All rewards are monetary; maximum rewards as pre-set and discounted depending on target 191 
attainment. Performance verification was initially done half-yearly in a peer-to-peer arrangement. At 192 
the end of 2014, an external agency was contracted to verify every three months. Facilities are required 193 
to invest 30% of their performance rewards into the facility, and can distribute 70% to staff as bonus 194 
payments. They are autonomous in their decisions how to divide the staff portion between staff 195 
members and how to invest the facility portion. The latter is with the exception of drugs, which health 196 
facilities are not allowed to purchase but continue to request from the DHMTs. Individual bonus 197 
payments amounted to an average of about 34 USD in the first quarter of 2015, with large variations 198 
between facilities and cadres, which is equivalent to about 6 % of health workers’ basic salary 199 
(Lohmann et al., 2018). 200 
Study design. This study took place in the context of a broader impact evaluation of the RBF4MNH 201 
Initiative (Brenner et al., 2014). We used a prospective mixed-methods design, with the quantitative 202 
component serving to estimate the impact of RBF4MNH on autonomous motivation, and the qualitative 203 
component serving to shed light on how RBF4MNH did or did not bring about such change in 204 
autonomous motivation.  205 
All 18 intervention facilities included in Phase I of RBF4MNH were included in the impact evaluation. 206 
As comparison facilities, 15 facilities in the four districts were selected which did not receive the 207 
intervention initially, but were to receive it after completion of the impact evaluation. However, due to 208 
early availability of additional funding, scale-up was advanced to shortly after the midterm data 209 
collection and included 5 of the original comparison facilities. At endline, the facility sample therefore 210 
included 23 intervention facilities (5 secondary-level and 18 primary-level), 5 of which had received 211 
RBF4MNH only for the latter half of the two-year impact evaluation period, and 10 comparison 212 
facilities (all primary-level). 213 
Ethical approval was granted by the ethical commissions of Heidelberg University’s medical faculty 214 
(protocol S-256/2012) and the University of Malawi’s College of Medicine (protocol P.02/13/1338).  215 
Quantitative study component 216 
The quantitative study component relied on a controlled pre- and post-test design. Data was collected 217 
with a structured health worker survey just before (March/April 2013; baseline) and approximately two 218 
years (June/July 2015; endline) after the start of the intervention.  219 
Sample. Within the 33 facilities, health workers providing maternal health care services (i.e. clinical 220 
officers, medical assistants, registered/enrolled nurse/midwives, nurse-midwife-technicians) who had 221 
worked at the health facility for at least one year were eligible for participation in the survey to allow 222 
for sufficient exposure to PBF and/or the current work environment. At primary level, all eligible staff 223 
available during the stay of our interviewer teams were interviewed; at secondary-level, at least five 224 
health workers from the maternity department were sampled. Table 1 contains demographic 225 
characteristics of the resulting sample. Differences were not statistically significant, except for level of 226 
care due to all secondary-level facilities being part of the intervention group.  227 
Autonomous motivation measure. Autonomous motivation was measured with six items from the 228 
SDT-based Work Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation Scale (WEIMS; Tremblay, Blanchard, Taylor, 229 
Pelletier, & Villeneuve, 2009). The WEIMS follows the measurement rationale that individuals reveal 230 
their locus of causality for behavior in the reasons for their actions they provide. Following the guiding 231 
question “Why do you do your work?” (WEIMS), a list of potential reason for why people are engaged 232 
in their job is provided. Reasons pertaining to autonomous motivation include for instance “I work in 233 
this job for the satisfaction I experience from taking on interesting challenges” or “I work in this job 234 
because my work has become a fundamental part of who I am”. Respondents are asked to indicate their 235 
degree of agreement on a scale from 1 to 5.  236 
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) confirmed that the six items measured autonomous motivation 237 
well (χ2(9)=9.748, p=.371; RMSEA=.024; CFI=0.990; SRMR=.044; item-factor loadings were of 238 
similar magnitude). Cronbach’s α (i.e. average inter-item correlation) was .72 overall and consistent 239 
across data collection time points and study groups, supporting the CFA results. Tests for measurement 240 
invariance showed equal measurement properties of the items in the intervention and comparison 241 
subsamples, confirming that autonomous motivation scores can be compared across study groups 242 
(Borghi et al., 2018). 243 
Data collection procedure. Data was collected by trained research assistants using tablet computers. 244 
Interviewer teams spent three days at each health facility at baseline, and five days at endline. The 245 
survey was administered in English as a face-to-face interview. All data collection activities started with 246 
an extensive explanation of the data collection purpose and reassurance on confidentiality concerns, 247 
seeking respondents’ written informed consent.  248 
Data analysis. For each respondent, we combined the autonomous motivation items into a composite 249 
score by calculating the unweighted mean of responses to the six items.  250 
We used a Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach to estimate the impact of RBF4MNH on 251 
autonomous motivation. The linear regression model was specified as  252 
Y𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐸𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽2 ⋅ [𝑃𝐵𝐹𝑓 ∗ 𝐸𝐿𝑡] + 𝜃𝑓 + 𝛽′ ⋅ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑓𝑖𝑡 253 
where Yfit is the level of autonomous motivation for individual i from facility f at time t with t={baseline 254 
endline}; ELt is a dummy variables indicating endline observations; PBFf is a dummy variable 255 
indicating individuals from intervention facilities (phase I and II); and Xit is ϵfit the error term. In the 256 
absence of a panel at health worker level, we used facility fixed effects (θf) to control for unobserved 257 
and potentially motivation-relevant time-invariant facility characteristics, and further controlled for a 258 
number of individual characteristics (sex, cadre, years at current facility, years in health care service; 259 
Xit). We clustered standard errors at the facility level (i.e. level of intervention assignment). Coefficient 260 
β2 gives the DID estimate for the effect of PBF on autonomous motivation. As all secondary-level 261 
facilities were part of the intervention, we performed the DID regressions both on the overall sample 262 
and on a subsample of only primary-level facility staff. 263 
 264 
Qualitative study component  265 
The qualitative study component consisted of in-depth interviews with nurse/midwives, medical 266 
assistants, and clinical officers from intervention facilities approximately one (April 2014, midterm) 267 
and two years (September 2015, endline) after the start of the intervention. We purposely selected 12 268 
and 14 facilities at midterm and endline, respectively, to represent the four districts, both levels of care, 269 
different facility sizes, and varying performance levels in the intervention. At each facility, we then 270 
purposely selected between 1 and 4 health workers, depending on facility size and staff availability and 271 
to represent both sexes and all seniority levels. Only health workers who had worked at the facility for 272 
at least one year were sampled to ensure sufficient exposure to RBF4MNH. In total, 21 and 20 health 273 
workers were interviewed at midterm and endline, respectively. Table 1 shows key characteristics of 274 
the sample. 275 
Data collection, management, and analysis procedures for the qualitative component are described in 276 
Lohmann et al. (2018). This article relies on the same material and general analytical procedures, 277 
including analyst triangulation, but applied a different, SDT-based analytical lens and framework, 278 
examining how the various positive and negative motivational mechanisms of RBF4MNH impacted 279 
health workers’ basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, and thereby 280 
autonomous motivation. 281 
Triangulation of quantitative and qualitative findings 282 
Quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed independently. Triangulation occurred at 283 
the interpretative level, with the final appraisal on the impact of RBF4MNH on autonomous motivation 284 
relying jointly on the quantitative and qualitative findings. Quantitative findings allowed a 285 
quantification of the impact of RBF4MNH on autonomous motivation. Qualitative findings were used 286 
to elucidate these quantitative findings. 287 
 288 
 289 
RESULTS  290 
Quantitative results  291 
Table 2 shows summary statistics as well as the model-estimated DID estimate for the impact of 292 
RBF4MNH on autonomous motivation, for the overall sample as well as the primary-level subsample. 293 
Health workers consistently indicated high levels of autonomous motivation at baseline, which 294 
remained stable over time. No impact of RBF4MNH on autonomous motivation could be detected. 295 
Qualitative results 296 
The qualitative findings offer possible explanations as to why no RBF4MH impact on autonomous 297 
motivation was apparent. Specifically, results suggest that the intervention did not simply leave health 298 
workers’ autonomous motivation unaffected. Rather, it appears that the intervention both positively and 299 
negatively affected the satisfaction of health workers’ basic psychological needs. In the following, we 300 
describe the most commonly mentioned effects. Important to note is that while all respondents 301 
experienced both positive and negative impact on their basic needs satisfaction, there was substantial 302 
individual variation in which effects were mentioned and in the extent to which positive or negative 303 
effects appeared to predominate.  304 
Need for competence 305 
Our analysis suggests that RBF4MNH contributed in mostly positive ways to the satisfaction of health 306 
workers’ need for competence – an inherent desire to do well in the various dimensions of one's job and 307 
to have an impact on one's work environment and outcomes –, although many respondents also alluded 308 
to a few negative aspects attenuating this overall positive impact.  309 
Our findings indicate that RBF4MNH enhanced satisfaction of the need for competence by improving 310 
health workers’ perceived ability to do their job. Many health workers expressed their appreciation for 311 
how RBF4MNH helped them develop their clinical skills and feel more confident at work through 312 
training measures and better on-the-job training as a result of the intervention. Almost all reported how 313 
the improved infrastructure, equipment, and resource situation resulting from RBF4MNH made them 314 
feel more effective in translating their skills into practice. Many health workers further described how 315 
they felt that their work teams had improved service delivery routines, working together more 316 
efficiently, as a consequence of RBF4MNH.  317 
Our results further suggest that RBF4MNH contributed to satisfying the need for competence by 318 
reminding health workers of the standards of care they had promised to deliver when joining the 319 
profession and helping them better understand performance expectations towards them. Health workers 320 
reported how the continuous performance feedback through enhanced supportive supervision and 321 
verification in the context of RBF4MNH provided new opportunities to critically evaluate their 322 
performance against these standards. Many described how by stimulating critical reflection on 323 
performance shortfalls, by guiding them in proactively developing strategies for improvement, and by 324 
enabling them to implement such solutions at least to some extent, the intervention helped them feel 325 
more effective in their work.  326 
The majority of respondents perceived that the quality of their work had improved as a result of 327 
RBF4MNH, some even improvements in patient outcomes, instilling in them a new sense of 328 
competence and pride in their accomplishments at work. 329 
I just have the morale because I know what am doing and with RBF4MNH, the fact that 330 
we have almost everything now. […] It was very different. Before, we were like ‘Aah, what 331 
am I going to do with the patient?’ […] But now we can treat them and you know the 332 
patients are getting well, you know ‘Aah, I’ve managed the sepsis and she is ok, she is 333 
going home.’ You feel good. (Nurse/midwife, endline) 334 
Although the vast majority of respondents perceived primarily positive effects of RBF4MNH on 335 
feelings of competence, many also reported aspects which weighed in negatively. Many health workers 336 
explained that RBF4MNH opened their eyes to their substandard level of performance and their non-337 
enabling and non-supportive working environment. While almost all respondents seemed to appreciate 338 
this ‘wake-up call’, it was not necessarily conducive to the satisfaction of the need for competence. The 339 
continued substandard working conditions keeping them from delivering truly high quality care – a 340 
situation which with RBF4MNH many saw with new clarity – negatively weighed on health workers’ 341 
feelings of self-efficacy. Particularly in the second year of the intervention, interviews revealed a 342 
growing frustration with the fact that RBF4MNH had increased workload and resource consumption, 343 
which were not met adequately with increases in staff and resources in many facilities.  344 
The vast majority of respondents seemed to be effective in externalizing their continued shortfalls from 345 
ideal performance standards, attributing it to the mismatch with between performance standards and 346 
working conditions rather than to own incompetence, and thereby containing negative impact on the 347 
satisfaction of the need for competence. Many also indicated that they were effective in focusing their 348 
attention on the improvements they did manage to achieve, rather than on shortfalls from the absolute 349 
performance ideals reflected in the RBF4MNH targets, thereby attenuating negative impact on basic 350 
need satisfaction.  351 
I think most of [RBF4MNH is] helpful, and if we had all resources that are required, 352 
human resources, material, equipment, we would really improve the mortality and 353 
morbidity rates among the mothers and the newborn babies. (Nurse/midwife, endline) 354 
However, a few respondents seemed less successful in ‘blaming the context’ and focusing on 355 
improvement rather than absolute achievement.  356 
I am proud being a nurse. In the morning, I go to the hospital to take care of the patients. 357 
At the end of the day I did nothing. So I feel as a failure. (Nurse/midwife, endline) 358 
 359 
Need for autonomy 360 
Our analysis indicates that RBF4MNH both positively and negatively contributed to health workers’ 361 
satisfaction of the need for autonomy – the desire to be able to shape one's experiences and behavior 362 
according to one's own goals and values, to believe in and endorse what one does at work, and to be 363 
able to, within professional borders, to decide and do as one thinks best.  364 
In positive terms, RBF4MNH appeared to support satisfaction of the basic need for autonomy in that 365 
virtually all health workers expressed strong endorsement of the overall intervention goals and feelings 366 
of ownership of the program. Even though very few respondents had been consulted in the intervention 367 
design stage, respondents also expressed strong endorsement of the indicator set, particularly its good 368 
alignment with existing standards of care they had committed themselves to when joining their 369 
profession.  370 
We feel good about being [part of RBF4MNH]. When the patients come in large numbers, 371 
we feel okay. This brings a lot of workload, but we are happy when they are here and we 372 
know that we are improving the livelihood of women and children, and on top of that, we 373 
will be rewarded. (Medical assistant, midterm) 374 
About half of the sample revealed how RBF4MNH helped them be more purposeful and effective in 375 
their work by stimulating awareness for and the development of locally tailored solutions to diverse 376 
challenges. Health workers described how the financial rewards further allowed facilities to implement 377 
at least some of these solutions in fast, non-bureaucratic, and effective ways, in stark contrast to what 378 
they were used to previously. By thereby not only passively improving working conditions and service 379 
delivery routines in a top-down, one-fits-all approach, but by rather allowing facilities to actively bring 380 
about desired positive change themselves through the PBF reward payments, it appears that RBF4MNH 381 
further positively contributed to the satisfaction of many health workers’ need for autonomy.  382 
[RBF4MNH] is good because it gives us power at the health center level to decide what’s 383 
good for us and what’s lacking for us instead of relying for everything on the district level. 384 
(Nurse/midwife, midterm)  385 
At the same time, almost all respondents made clear that the decentralization of financial management 386 
autonomy did not go far enough, with solutions to many problems such as the availability of staff and 387 
drugs remaining beyond their control. They described this as frustrating, particularly having 388 
experienced the advantages of procurement autonomy. In light of this, perceptions about the targets 389 
attached to the indicators were much more mixed than perceptions about the indicators themselves. 390 
Although respondents were in general agreement that high performance standards should be attained, 391 
many did not feel like this was currently possible given the contextual constraints and the high workload 392 
they were faced with, at least for certain indicators. RBF4MNH thereby put at least some health workers 393 
in a position where they perceived their freedom or scope of action as even further restricted, asking 394 
them to pursue targets that they did not feel they could attain, at least not without compromising other 395 
aspects of their work or their personal wellbeing. At the same time, the high stakes (i.e. reputational 396 
aspects, reward payments; individual ‘opting out’ difficult given implementation at team level) 397 
associated with performing well in the intervention appeared put pressure on at least some health 398 
workers. A few respondents reported that they had witnessed colleagues coping with this situation in 399 
undesired ways, such as by forging register entries, although nobody admitted to having done so 400 
themselves.  401 
The picture that people have outside [is] that we are not doing anything, yet to us, it’s not 402 
deliberate, it’s just that the situation is not allowing us. It’s hard. We can’t do what we are 403 
required to do, but there is nothing I can do about it. I still come to work normally, but 404 
deep down, I feel things are not working. (Nurse/midwife, endline) 405 
Need for relatedness 406 
In regards to the satisfaction of health workers’ need for relatedness – the desire for positive 407 
relationships and interactions with, for feeling fairly treated, respected, and valued by, for feeling 408 
recognized by, and for feeling cared for and supported by clients, community, colleagues, direct 409 
superiors, and the broader health system – our results suggest that RBF4MNH also had both positive 410 
and negative effects, but negative effects seemed more pronounced for the majority of respondents.  411 
On the positive side, RBF4MNH appears to have led to more attention being paid to health workers by 412 
their managers, the broader health system, and also clients. This is substantiated by about a third of the 413 
respondents describing how with RBF4MNH, they felt more visible and appreciated. They also 414 
perceived a growing recognition of their difficult working conditions, and respect for their effort and 415 
performance despite these difficult working conditions. They experienced this as generally positive 416 
compared to the pre-RBF4MNH situation, where many felt that nobody cared about them and their 417 
circumstances except in cases of serious underperformance. Respondents expressed high appreciation 418 
of the material and immaterial support by RBF4MNH and the small improvements in DHMT support 419 
experienced by some facilities, which alleviated some of their hardships at work and in their private 420 
lives.  421 
We feel good because [the DHMT now] comes and recommends us that we are doing a 422 
very good job. Like the water system, we actually decided ourselves to do it [with 423 
RBF4MNH money]. They appreciate that that’s very good. And the toilet too, we told them 424 
that we are building this. They said, you are doing a very good job. They really appreciate 425 
us and recognize the role we are playing. (Medical assistant, endline) 426 
Respondents further described how RBF4MNH stimulated improvements in team work in many 427 
facilities as staff members worked towards the common goal of achieving RBF4MNH targets. In many 428 
facilities, this resolved previous frustrations and interpersonal conflict in service delivery routines, 429 
thereby contributing to the satisfaction of the need for relatedness.  430 
On the other hand, respondents also revealed that RBF4MNH led to substantial interpersonal challenges 431 
by allowing health facilities to freely decide over how to share money among staff members. The 432 
ensuing tension and fighting was a source of frustration for almost all respondents, particularly in the 433 
first year of implementation, negatively impacting the satisfaction of their need for relatedness. Some 434 
health workers ended up receiving very small absolute incentive amounts. They described how against 435 
the expectation that they should feel motivated by these small amounts, the incentives offended them 436 
rather than making them feel recognized and respected. Compromises in sharing incentives led to many 437 
health workers feeling undervalued, as they did not think their share of the rewards fair in relation to 438 
the effort they had contributed to their facility’s performance.  439 
I think the [RBF4MNH secretariat] should decide [who gets how much], because this 440 
money is creating a lot of enmity. […] Wherever there is money, people always disagree.  441 
(Nurse/midwife, midterm) 442 
Most health workers further perceived other elements and dynamics of the intervention as unfair, 443 
weighing negatively of the satisfaction of their need for relatedness. Particularly in the first year of 444 
implementation where the peer-to-peer verification model was applied, many health workers felt that 445 
evaluators were unfair in their evaluations, leading to results which they felt did not reflect their true 446 
performance, and to reward amounts below what they felt was appropriate. Several respondents further 447 
complained that the DHMTs and the RBF4MNH secretariat did not adequately reciprocate their own 448 
effort in making the project a success. Finally, particularly at endline, as contextual challenges became 449 
more pronounced, several health workers voiced that they felt disrespected by an intervention 450 
benefitting women without regard for health workers’ already challenging working conditions and at 451 
the expense of their health and wellbeing.   452 
 453 
DISCUSSION  454 
Our Self-Determination Theory-based study investigated whether and how the Results-based Financing 455 
for Maternal and Newborn Health Initiative in Malawi affected health workers’ intrinsic motivation. 456 
We thereby contributed to closing an important gap in knowledge regarding one of the most frequently 457 
discussed potential unfavorable consequences of PBF, namely an erosion of high-quality, sustainable 458 
motivation, “intrinsic motivation crowding out”.  459 
Results suggest that overall, RBF4MNH did not impact health workers’ intrinsic motivation. This 460 
finding is somewhat different from the findings of the three previous studies on the impact of PBF on 461 
intrinsic motivation, all of which conclude that some crowding out of intrinsic motivation appears to 462 
have occurred (Aninanya et al., 2016; Dale, 2014; Huillery & Seban, 2014). As neither of the previous 463 
studies systematically examined how PBF effected changes in intrinsic motivation, reasons for the 464 
differences between our and their results remain unclear.  465 
In Malawi, our qualitative findings support the hypothesis that PBF does not have a generally adverse 466 
effect on intrinsic motivation as feared by some, but that it rather has the potential of both crowding in 467 
and crowding out intrinsic motivation, depending on the specific intervention design, implementation, 468 
and results, and health workers’ experiences thereof (Lohmann et al., 2016). Specifically, our findings 469 
suggest that the different motivational mechanisms triggered by RBF4MNH both positively and 470 
negatively affected health workers’ basic psychological needs satisfaction. We found substantial 471 
individual variation in the extent to which respondents perceived positive and negative effects. For most 472 
respondents, however, positive and negative effects appeared to have counteracted each other to some 473 
extent, offering at least a partial explanation for the overall null impact of RBF4MNH on intrinsic 474 
motivation. Although our study did not set out to disentangle the effects of the individual rewards – to 475 
which fears of crowding out primarily relate – from all other intervention elements, it does appear that 476 
the individual rewards were primarily associated with negative effects on basic needs satisfaction. In 477 
summary, RBF4MNH appeared conducive to intrinsic motivation in many ways, but it also clearly fell 478 
short of its intrinsic motivation-enhancing potential due to various challenges.  479 
These challenges will not come as a surprise to the PBF implementing and academic community, as 480 
many of them are well-known from other settings (e.g. Sierra Leone, Bertone, Lagarde, & Witter, 2016; 481 
Nigeria, Bhatnagar & George, 2016; Tanzania, Chimhutu et al., 2016; Benin, Paul et al., 2014; Burkina 482 
Faso, Ridde, Yaogo, Zongo, Somé, & Turcotte-Tremblay 2018; Zambia, Shen et al., 2017), and neither 483 
will the straightforward recommendations implied by our research to avoid or contain negative impact 484 
on intrinsic motivation, such as: to maximize transparency in the verification and reward allocation 485 
process as well as in the reward use and distribution process; to adhere to planning, timing, and made 486 
agreements, and communicate effectively in case of delays or changes; and to set achievable PBF targets 487 
or employ a fee-for-measure logic.  488 
At the same time, many intrinsic motivation-relevant challenges encountered in Malawi and elsewhere 489 
might be beyond what can realistically be counteracted by clever PBF design and implementation. For 490 
instance, it seems that dissatisfaction with and feelings of unfairness regarding the individual rewards 491 
are not necessarily directly related to the actual reward amounts and distribution modes. In Malawi, 492 
neither the increase in overall reward amounts in the second year, nor various distribution modes 493 
negotiated locally (e.g. equal shares for all, higher shares for higher qualified staff) appeared to make 494 
much of a difference in terms of satisfaction and fairness perceptions. Many respondents expressed a 495 
wish for RBF4MNH to prescribe a reward distribution mode. Although in some countries with such 496 
fixed modes, complaints appear less pronounced (e.g. Bertone et al., 2016, in Sierra Leone; Paul et al., 497 
2014, in Benin), reasons might lie elsewhere, and serious injustice perceptions around incentive 498 
distributions have been encountered in fixed-mode countries as well (e.g. Ridde et al., 2018, in Burkina 499 
Faso). In Tanzania, the distribution mode based on health workers’ level of involvement in the 500 
intervention was also perceived as unjust by many health workers (Chimhutu et al., 2016). Other issues 501 
difficult to counteract with PBF design and implementation include for instance resource challenges 502 
related to the broader health system and the setting of PBF targets attainable yet aligned with national 503 
performance standards which often are overly ambitious given contextual constraints.  504 
In light of this, designing a PBF intervention fully free of intrinsic motivation-compromising challenges 505 
is likely a futile endeavor. Rather, PBF designers might want to pay more attention to ‘secondary 506 
prevention’ of inadvertent negative impact on intrinsic motivation. One concept much discussed and 507 
researched in the SDT and organizational change literature is that of “autonomy support” (e.g. Gilbert 508 
& Kelloway, 2014). It refers to leader behavior which supports employees in behavior change processes 509 
so that the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs is supported rather than thwarted, and so that 510 
employees are able to internalize and therefore perceive new behavior as self-determined rather than 511 
controlled. Three general principals of how managers can support employees’ autonomy are to provide 512 
rationale for behavior change, helping employees understand why decisions were taken and change is 513 
necessary; to offer employees maximal choice in how to go about implementing change and 514 
reorganizing their work processes, within technical limits; and to acknowledge employees’ feelings 515 
about the change process and supporting them in coping with these feelings. Offering maximal 516 
autonomy in implementing change along with technical and managerial support as well as activities to 517 
help health workers understand the meaningfulness, benefits, and costs of PBF are already part of good 518 
PBF design practice (Fritsche et al., 2014). In contrast, specific training for health facility, district, and 519 
PBF management staff in how to support health workers in cognitively and emotionally processing and 520 
coping with the introduction of PBF to preclude or resolve diverse intrinsic motivation-adverse 521 
frustrations is usually not part of standard PBF intervention packages. Such systematic autonomy 522 
support training for managers in the context of PBF might be valuable in maximizing positive 523 
motivational impact of PBF for health workers.  524 
Unfortunately, our study did not allow to explore potentially important heterogeneity in PBF impact on 525 
autonomous motivation, or to quantify and detect individual variation in how the different elements of 526 
RBF4MNH contributed to changes in basic needs satisfaction, how basic needs satisfaction in turn 527 
impacted autonomous motivation, and which other variables might have played a relevant role. Further, 528 
the period of observation was limited to only two years, which might be too short for fundamental 529 
changes in motivational structures to occur. Finally, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that PBF 530 
differentially affected turnover of staff with different levels of intrinsic motivation, and that baseline 531 
and endline samples are therefore not perfectly comparable. However, a sensitivity analysis limiting the 532 
quantitative endline sample to only those health workers who had worked at their endline facility at 533 
baseline already supported the robustness of the quantitative findings. Future research with a panel 534 
design and closer alignment of the quantitative and qualitative study components allowing such linkages 535 
will be very valuable for an even more in-depth understanding of the motivational impact of PBF, as 536 
well as potential risk and mitigating factors.  537 
 538 
CONCLUSION 539 
We found no effect of RBF4MNH in Malawi on health workers’ intrinsic motivation; neither crowding 540 
in nor crowding out of intrinsic motivation could be observed overall. Health workers described 541 
experiencing various positive and negative intervention effects on the satisfaction of their basic 542 
psychological needs, which appeared to counteract each other at least partly. To achieve crowding in of 543 
intrinsic motivation, PBF designers and implementers should contain avoidable intrinsic motivation-544 
compromising challenges and mitigate unintended negative impact of unavoidable challenges by 545 
explicitly building strategies such as autonomy support activities into PBF designs. 546 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics 642 
 643 
 Quantitative sample Qualitative sample 
 Intervention Comparison Intervention 
 Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Midterm Endline 
 n % n % n % n % n n 
Total 60  51  10  20  21 20 
Sex           
    Female 41 68 29 57 6 60 10 50 11 11 
    Male 19 32 22 43 4 40 10 50 10 9 
Health worker type           
    Clinical officer,    
    medical assistant 
7 12 12 24 1 10 5 25 5 2 
    Nurse/midwife 53 88 39 76 9 90 15 75 16 18 
Level of care           
    Primary 27 45 29 57 10 100 20 100 10 11 
    Secondary 33 55 22 43 0 0 0 0 11 9 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd median median 
Years at facility 5.3 6.0 6.1 6.9 4.2 3.9 3.3 1.9 3.0 3.5 
Years in service 12.3 12.7 10.0 11.5 17.2 10.3 14.3 15.5 - - 
 644 
 645 
 646 
 647 
 648 
 649 
 650 
 651 
 652 
Table 2: Impact of RBF4MNH on health workers’ autonomous motivation (1=high level; 5=low 653 
level) 654 
 655 
 Intervention Comparison Difference-
in-
differences 
 Baseline Endline Baseline Endline 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd DID p 
Full sample 2.01 .50 1.95 .49 1.85 .51 1.71 .43 -.035 .833 
Primary care 
level 
subsample 
1.95 .42 1.91 .52 1.85 .51 1.71 .43 .022 .910 
 656 
